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Abstract
Milton Friedman argued that irrational traders will consistently lose money, won’t survive
and, therefore, cannot inﬂuence long run equilibrium asset prices. Since his work, survival
and price impact have been assumed to be the same. In this paper, we demonstrate that
survival and price impact are two independent concepts. The price impact of irrational
traders does not rely on their long-run survival and they can have a signiﬁcant impact on
asset prices even when their wealth becomes negligible. We also show that irrational traders’
portfolio policies can deviate from their limits long after the price process approaches its long-
run limit. We show, in contrast to a partial equilibrium analysis, these general equilibrium
considerations matter for the irrational traders’ long-run survival. In sum, we explicitly show
that price impact can persist whether or not the irrational traders survive.
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AP r o o f s 31Most neoclassical asset pricing models rely on the assumption that market participants
(traders) are rational in the sense that they behave in ways that are consistent with the
objective probabilities of the states of the economy (e.g., Radner (1971) and Lucas (1978)).
More particularly, they maximize expected utilities using the true probabilities of uncertain
economic states. This approach is ﬁrmly rooted in the tradition of going from the normative
to the positive in economics, yet there is mounting evidence that it is not descriptive of
the observed behavior of the average market participant (see, e.g., Alpert and Raiﬀa (1959),
Benartzi and Thaler (2001), Black (1986), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and Odean 1998)).
How the presence of traders with incorrect beliefs may aﬀect the behavior of ﬁnancial markets
remains an open question.
It has long been argued (see, e.g., Friedman (1953)) that irrational traders who use wrong
beliefs cannot survive in a competitive market. Trading under the wrong beliefs causes them
to lose their wealth. In the long-run, it is the rational traders who control most of the wealth
and determine asset prices. Using a partial equilibrium model, De Long, Shleifer, Summers
and Waldmann (1991) suggest that traders with wrong beliefs may survive in the long-run
because they may hold portfolios with higher growth rates and therefore can eventually
outgrow the rational traders.1 In contrast, in a general equilibrium setting, Sandroni (2000)
and Blume and Easley (2001) show that with intermediate consumption, irrational traders
do not survive in the long-run.
The eﬃciency of ﬁnancial markets is the principal motivation behind the interest in the
survival of irrational traders. If irrational traders impact asset prices, then markets will not
be eﬃcient, either informationally or allocationally. Implicitly, the discussion on survival is
based on the assumption that survival is a necessary condition for long-run price impact.
It is thought that irrational traders have to control a signiﬁcant amount of wealth in order
to aﬀect – or ‘infect’ – prices with their irrational beliefs. In this paper, we show that this
assumption is false and that irrational traders can maintain a large price impact even as
their relative wealth diminishes towards zero over time.
Our analysis is conducted with a parsimonious general equilibrium model inhabited by
both rational traders and irrational traders. Traders only care about their terminal con-
sumption. We are able to derive an explicit solution to the model and obtain conditions
under which the irrational traders can survive in the long run in the sense that their share of
the total wealth does not go to zero over time. However, we show that even when irrational
traders do not survive, with a negligible amount of wealth they can still exert signiﬁcant
1See also Figlewski (1978) for a discussion on the notion of long-run survival.
1inﬂuence on the asset price over a long period of time.
Underlying this initially counterintuitive result is a solid economic intuition. Under
incorrect beliefs, irrational traders express their views by taking positions (bets) on extremely
unlikely states of the economy. As a result, the state prices of these extreme states can be
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the beliefs of the irrational traders, even with negligible wealth. In
turn, these states, even though highly unlikely, can have a large contribution to current asset
prices. This is especially true for states associated with extremely low levels of aggregate
consumption in which the traders’ marginal utilities are very high and so too are state prices.
The beliefs of the irrational traders on these low probability but high marginal utility states
can inﬂuence current asset prices and their dynamics. Furthermore, irrational traders need
not take extreme positions in order to inﬂuence prices. Our formal analysis clearly veriﬁes
this conceptual distinction between the long-run price impact and the long-run survival of
irrational traders.
The possibility that irrational traders may have a signiﬁcant price impact with a negligible
share of wealth also has important implications for their survival. In the partial equilibrium
analysis of De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1991) (DSSW, thereafter), it was
assumed that when the irrational traders control only a negligible fraction of the total wealth,
they have no impact on asset prices, i.e., asset prices behave as if the irrational traders
are absent. Given the rationally determined prices, DSSW then show that the wealth of
irrational traders can grow at a faster rate than the wealth of the rational traders, allowing
the irrational traders to recover from their losses and survive in the long-run. Although such
an argument is illuminating, it is based on unreliable premises. As we have argued, irrational
traders may still inﬂuence prices with diminishing wealth. Moreover, such a possibility can
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the irrational traders’ portfolio policies in ways that make their recovery
from losses diﬃcult.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we provide a simple example to illustrate
the possibility for an agent to aﬀect asset prices with a negligible wealth. Section 2 de-
scribes a canonical economy similar to that of Black and Scholes (1973), but in the presence
of irrational traders who have persistently wrong beliefs about the economy, and Section
3 describes the general equilibrium of this economy. Section 4 treats the special case of
logarithmic preferences and demonstrates that even though irrational traders never survive
in this case, they nevertheless can still inﬂuence long-run asset prices. Sections 5, 6, and 7
analyze the survival of irrational traders, their price impact and their portfolio policies for
the case of risk aversion diﬀerent from one. Section 8 discusses the importance of equilib-
rium eﬀects on the survival of irrational traders. Section 9 concludes the paper with a short
2summary and some suggestions for future research. All proofs are given in the appendix.
1A n E x a m p l e
We begin our analysis by considering a simple, static Arrow-Debreu economy and will show
that an agent with only a negligible amount of wealth can have a signiﬁcant impact on asset
prices by using certain trading policies.
The economy has two dates, 0 and 1. It is endowed with one unit of a risky asset, which
pays a dividend D only at date 1. The realization of D falls in [0,1] with probability density
p(D)=2 D, which is plotted in Figure 1(a).












































































































Figure 1: Probability distribution of the stock dividend (the left panel), the aggregate con-
sumption level (D) and the noise trade consumption (Cn) when he is present (the middle panel),
and the relative consumption of the noise trader (Cn/D, right panel). Parameter δ is set to 0.2.
There is a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities traded in a competitive ﬁnancial
market at date 0. Shares of the stock and a risk-free bond with a sure payoﬀ of 1 at date 1,
both of which are baskets of the Arrow-Debreu securities, are also traded. We use the bond
as the numeraire for the security prices at date 0. Thus, the bond price is always 1.
We ﬁrst consider the economy when it is populated by a representative agent with a
logarithmic utility function over consumption at date 1, u(C)=l o g C. It immediately







3where a∗ is a constant. The price of any payoﬀ X is then given by
P =E[X · φ
∗ ].











∗ dD =2 a
∗ =1
which gives a∗ =
1
2. The price of the stock is then given by
S














Now we introduce another trader to the economy who has a negligible amount of wealth
and desires a particular consumption bundle. We denote this trader with ”N” and call him
a noise trader. The noise trader demands the following consumption bundle:
Cn =( 1− δ)min(δ,D), 0 <δ<1
which is plotted in Figure 1(b). Figure 1(c) plots Cn as a fraction of the total consumption
D.S i n c eCn ≤ δ(1−δ), the wealth the noise trader needs to acquire the consumption bundle,
is
Wn =E[Cn · φ] ≤ E[δ(1 − δ) · φ]=δ(1 − δ) <δ
where we have used the fact that the bond price is 1. The consumption for the representative
agent (excluding the noise trade) is then C = D −Cn, also shown in Figure 1(b). The state




D − (1 − δ)min(δ,D)























δ(1 − δ)[ln(1 − δ + δ
2) − 2ln(δ)]
 −1
4As noted above, the wealth needed to acquire the consumption bundle Cn, Wn,i sl e s st h a n
δ, so it is small if δ is small. The stock price in the presence of the noise trader is given by



























where O(δ) denotes terms of order δ or higher. Thus, S/S∗ = 1
2 + O(δ). We can measure







which remains non-negligible even when δ, and therefore the amount of wealth controlled by
the noise trader, approaches zero.
This is a stark result: a price-taking trader with negligible wealth can exert ﬁnite inﬂuence
on asset prices. The noise trader spends most of his wealth on consumption in low-dividend
states. Given that the marginal utility of the other traders in these states is very high,
the state prices for these states are also high and, more importantly, a small change in the
consumption level can change the state prices signiﬁcantly. As we show above, the wealth
required for the noise traders to ﬁnance their desired consumption proﬁle is small, even
though most of their consumption occurs in states with relatively high state prices.
While the above example is rather simple, its intuition holds more generally. In the case
of logarithmic preferences, the state price density is proportional to the rational trader’s
marginal utility u (C): φ = au (C), where a is the proportionality constant. When the
irrational trader is introduced into the economy and he purchases ε units of state-contingent
claims that pay oﬀ only when the aggregate consumption is C, the state-price density will
change by ∆φ ≈− au  (C)ε. The total cost for the purchase is w ≡ φε ≈ au (C)ε when ε is
small. Divided by the wealth spent by the irrational trader, we obtain the marginal change









which is independent of ε. Clearly, in “bad” states, in which C is low (close to zero), irrational
traders can have a large impact on the state-price density with little wealth if they decide to
bet on these states. Through their impact on the state-price density in bad states, irrational
traders can inﬂuence asset prices, such as the prices of the stock and the bond. Given that
5the bond is used as a numeraire and its price is always one, this inﬂuence is captured in the
stock price, given by S =E[D · φ], as shown above.
Our example clearly demonstrates the possibility of inﬂuencing asset prices with little
wealth. The remaining question is whether such a situation can arise in “realistic” settings.
In particular, for our purpose in this paper, can the irrational traders with incorrect beliefs
maintain a signiﬁcant price impact even as their relative wealth diminishes from investment
losses in the market? In the remainder of the paper, we use a canonical model to address
these questions.
2 The Model
We consider a standard setting similar to that of Black and Scholes (1973). For simplicity,
we make the model parsimonious.
Information structure
The economy has a ﬁnite horizon and evolves in continuous time. Uncertainty is described
by a one-dimensional, standard Brownian motion Bt for 0 ≤ t ≤ T, deﬁned on a complete
probability space (Ω,F,P), where F is the augmented ﬁltration generated by Bt.
The ﬁnancial market
There is a single share of a risky asset in the economy, the stock, which pays a terminal
dividend payment DT at time T, determined by process:
dDt = Dt (µdt + σdBt)( 1 )
where D0 =1a n dσ>0. There is also a zero coupon bond available in zero net supply.
Each unit of the bond makes a sure payment of one at time T.W eu s et h er i s k - f r e eb o n da s
the numeraire and denote the price of the stock at time t by St.
Endowments
There are two competitive traders in the economy, each endowed with a half share of the
stock (and none of the bond) at time zero.
6Trading strategies
The ﬁnancial market is frictionless and has no constraints on lending and borrowing. Traders’





t d S t < ∞
where θt is the number of stock shares held in the portfolio at time t and  S t is the quadratic
variation process of St (see, e.g., Duﬃe and Huang (1986) and Harrison and Kreps (1979)).
Preferences and beliefs





T ,γ ≥ 1.
For ease of exposition, we only consider the cases when γ ≥ 1. The cases when 0 <γ<1
can be analyzed similarly and the results are similar in spirit.
Standard aggregation results imply that each trader in our model can actually represent
a collection of traders with the same preferences. This provides a justiﬁcation for our com-
petitive assumption for each of the traders. The ﬁrst trader, the rational trader, knows the












where the subscript r denotes quantities associated with the rational trader. The second
trader, the irrational trader, believes incorrectly that the probability measure is Q, under
which
















t is the standard Brownian motion under the measure Q and η is a constant,
parameterizing the degree of irrationality of the irrational trader. When η is positive, the
irrational trader is optimistic about the prospects of the economy and overestimates the rate
7of growth of the aggregate endowment. Conversely, a negative η corresponds to a pessimistic












where the subscript n denotes quantities associated with the irrational trader.
Because η is assumed to be constant, the probability measure of the irrational trader Q
is absolutely continuous with respect to the objective measure P, i.e., both traders agree on
zero-probability events. Let ξt ≡ (dQ/dP)t denote the density (Radon-Nikodym derivative)



























This permits us to interpret the objective of the irrational trader as the expected value of a




n,T , under the true probability measure P.
The equivalence between incorrect beliefs and state dependent preferences raises a con-
ceptual question about the precise deﬁnition of irrationality. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to address this question, and our analysis of this form of irrationality is primarily
motivated by the fact that it is widely adopted in the recent literature on behavioral models
of asset prices.
3 The Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium of the economy deﬁned above can be solved analytically. Since
there is only one source of uncertainty in the economy, the ﬁnancial market is dynamically
complete as long as the volatility of stock returns remains non-zero almost surely. Conse-
















s.t. Cr,T + Cn,T = DT (8b)
8where b is the ratio of the utility weights for the two traders. The equilibrium allocation is
characterized in the following proposition.

































  . (11)
For the stock, ZT = DT and its return volatility is bounded between σ and σ(1 + |η|).
Since the instantaneous volatility of stock returns is bounded below by σ,t h es t o c k
and the bond dynamically complete the ﬁnancial market. In the limiting cases when only
the rational or the irrational trader is present, the stock prices, denoted by S∗
t and S∗∗
t ,














We will use this equilibrium model to analyze the survival and extinction of the traders.
We employ the following common deﬁnition of extinction, and, conversely, of survival.







The relative extinction of the rational trader can be deﬁned symmetrically. A trader is said
to survive relatively in the long-run if relative extinction does not occur.
9In the above deﬁnition and throughout the paper, all limits are understood to be almost
sure (under the true probability measure P) unless speciﬁcally stated otherwise.
In our model, the ﬁnal wealth of each trader equals their terminal consumption. Thus, the
deﬁnition of survival and extinction is equivalent to a similar deﬁnition in terms of wealth.
4 Logarithmic Preferences
We ﬁrst consider the case where both the rational and the irrational traders have logarithmic
preferences. We have the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose η  =0 .F o rγ =1 , the irrational trader never survives.
This result is immediate. For γ = 1, the rational trader holds the portfolio with maximum
expected growth (see, e.g., Hakansson (1971)). Any deviation in beliefs from the true proba-
bility causes the irrational trader to move away from the maximum growth portfolio, which
leads to his long-run relative extinction.
Our interest here, however, is not on the survival of the irrational trader, but on the
impact of irrationality on the long-run stock price. Under logarithmic preferences, b =1a n d
from Proposition 2 the stock price is
St =
1+ξt








t denotes the stock price in an identical economy populated only by the rational
trader, given in (12). We now prove that the irrational trader can maintain a large impact
on the stock price despite losing most of his wealth. To state our result formally, we deﬁne







,α r,t ≡ 1 − αn,t
The price impact the irrational trader can be measured by 1 − St
S∗
t , the relative deviation in
stock price from its limiting value with only the rational trader. We have




12(1+|η|)T, there exists a point in time t ≥ T/(1 + |η|), such that







≤ 1 − ε
 
≤ ε. (15b)
Intuitively, Proposition 3 shows that after a long period of time, which constitutes a nontrivial
fraction of the horizon of the economy, the relative wealth of the irrational trader is most
likely to be very small (which is consistent with his long-run extinction), but his impact on
the stock price is most likely to remain large (the ratio St/S∗
t stays far away from one).
Another way to illustrate the persistent nature of the irrational trader’s price impact is
by examining the long-run behavior of the instantaneous moments of stock returns, which
can be derived explicitly. For example, the conditional volatility of stock returns is






and the conditional mean is
µS,t = σ
2
S,t − αn,tησσ S,t.
To visualize the behavior of stock return moments, consider the following numerical example.
The irrational trader is assumed to be pessimistic (η = −2). The horizon of the economy is
set to T = 400, so the relative wealth of the irrational trader becomes relatively small long
before the ﬁnal date. We let the current time t be suﬃciently large, so with high probability
most of wealth in the economy is controlled by the rational trader. For convenience, we
deﬁne the following normalized state variable:
gs,t ≡
Bt − Bs √
t − s
(16)
where s<t . It is easy to show that gs,t is the unanticipated dividend growth normalized
by its standard deviation, which has a standard normal distribution. Figure 2 plots the
Sharpe ratio of instantaneous stock returns and the wealth distribution between the two
traders at t = 150 against the normalized state variable g0,t. The probability density for g0,t
is illustrated by the shaded area (with the vertical axis on the right). The bottom panel of
Figure 2 shows that with almost probability one, the wealth of the economy is all controlled
by the rational trader at this time. Yet as the top panel of the ﬁgure shows, the conditional
Sharpe ratio of stock returns is very diﬀerent from σ, which is its value in the economy
11populated only by the rational trader. In particular, over a large range of values of the
dividends, the conditional Sharpe ratio of returns is approximately equal to σ(1 − η)  = σ.










































Figure 2: The conditional Sharpe ratio of stock returns, µS,t/σS,t and the wealth distribution
αr,t = Wr,t/(Wr,t + Wn,t) are plotted against the normalized state variable, g0,t ≡ Bt/
√
t.T h e
shaded area is the probability density function of the normalized state variable (vertical axis on
the right). The model parameters are set at µ =0 .05, σ =0 .15, η = −2, T = 400 and γ =1 .
The current time is t = 150.
Figure 3 provides a complimentary illustration. It shows the most likely path over time
(the path with highest probability) for the irrational trader’s wealth share and the Sharpe
ratio of stock returns. In fact, the irrational trader’s wealth share diminishes to zero expo-
nentially while his price impact diminishes at a much slower rate. The Sharpe ratio stays
away from its level in an economy without an irrational trader for an extended period of
time before eventually converging to the limiting value.
In order to better understand how the irrational trader can exert inﬂuence on the stock
price despite having negligible wealth, we examine how his presence aﬀects the state price
density (SPD). The left panels of Figure 4 plot the relative consumption shares of the rational
and the irrational traders at two diﬀerent times, t =0 ,25, as a function of the normalized
state variable, gt,T, i.e., the normalized unanticipated dividend growth from t to T deﬁned
in (16). At each date, the state of the economy is conditioned on Bt = 0, the most likely
state. For t = 0, the irrational trader owns half of the economy. But at η = −4, he
is very pessimistic and bets on states of low dividends (states toward the left end of the
horizontal axis). This is shown in the top left panel of Figure 4. The dashed line plots































Figure 3: The maximum likelihood path of the irrational trader’s wealth share, αn,t =
Wn,t/(Wr,t + Wn,t), and the Sharpe ratio, µS,t/σS,t. The model parameters are set at µ =0 .05,
σ =0 .15, η = −2, T = 400 and γ =1 .
his terminal consumption for diﬀerent states of the economy. It is worth pointing out that
the consumption choice of the irrational trader in this economy is similar to that in the
simple one-period economy we considered in Section 1, as shown in Figure 1(c), where the
irrational trader consumes a share of 1 − δ of the aggregate endowment in states with low
dividends and much smaller share in other states. This explains why in both economies the
irrational trader can exert signiﬁcant inﬂuence on prices despite of being left with relatively
little wealth.
Over time, the ‘bad’ states become less likely and the irrational trader’s bets become
less valuable. Thus, his wealth decreases. At t =2 5a n dBt = 0, these bad states become
extremely unlikely and the irrational trader has lost most of his wealth. His wealth as fraction
of total wealth has fallen from 1/2 at t = 0 to 0.01. As shown in the bottom left panel of
Figure 4, going forward, irrational trader consumes a non-trivial fraction of the total wealth
only in the extreme states toward the left end of the horizontal axis. The probability of these
states, as shown by the shaded area, becomes very small and so is the irrational trader’s
wealth.
In the two panels on the right of Figure 4, we plot the state price density against the
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Figure 4: The terminal consumption of the rational and irrational traders as a fraction of the
total consumption and the state price density (SPD) in diﬀerent terminal states of the economy
at diﬀerent times. The model parameters are set to be µ =0 .05, σ =0 .15, η = −4, γ =1a n dT =
50. The horizontal axis in all panels is the normalized state variable gt,T ≡ (BT − Bt)/
√
T − t,
which has a standard normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance, which is shown
by the shaded area (vertical axis on the right). In the two panels on the left, the terminal
consumption for the rational trader (the solid line) and the irrational trader (the dotted line)
are plotted against the normalized state variable at times t =0 ,25, respectively, when Bt =0 .
In the two panels on the right, the dashed line plots the logarithm of the state price density at
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. The solid line plots

























which is represented by the dashed line in each of the two panels. The solid line plots the
state price density when the economy is populated only by the rational traders, which can be
obtained by setting ξT = 0 in the above expression for φt. The top panel gives the state price
density at t = 0. At this point, the irrational trader has a half share of the total wealth and
his portfolio policy has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the state price density over the whole range.
In particular, being pessimistic, he is eﬀectively betting on the bad states, which causes the
state price density to increase for the bad states and decrease for the good states. This is
14shown by the diﬀerence between the dashed line, the state price density in the presence of
the irrational trader, and the solid line, the state price density without the irrational trader.
As time passes, the irrational trader’s wealth dwindles and his inﬂuence on the state price
density diminishes quickly for most of the states, as the bottom panel for t =2 5s h o w s .
However, for the extremely bad states his inﬂuence remains signiﬁcant because he is still
betting heavily on these states.
We can show that the price impact of the irrational trader with negligible wealth does
not rely on excessive leverage. The fraction of irrational trader’s wealth invested in the
s t o c ki sg i v e nb yσS,t + ησ(1 − αn,t), which is bounded in absolute value by σ(1 + 2|η|).
The irrational trader can make bets on states with low aggregate endowment not by taking
extreme portfolio positions, but rather by under-weighting the stock in his portfolio over
long periods of time.
The simple case of logarithmic preferences developed above clearly shows that survival
and price impact are in general not equivalent. In particular, survival is not a necessary
condition for the irrational trader to inﬂuence long-run prices, and depending on their be-
liefs, irrational traders can maintain a signiﬁcant price impact even as their wealth becomes
negligible over time.
In the remaining sections, we consider the general case when γ  =1a n da n a l y z et h e
survival of the irrational trader, his price impact, and his portfolio choices.
5 Survival
In the case of logarithmic preferences, the irrational trader does not survive in the long-run
simply because his portfolio grows more slowly than the maximum growth rate, the rate
achieved by the rational trader. For the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion diﬀerent from
one, though, the rational trader no longer holds the optimal growth portfolio and under an
incorrect belief, the irrational trader may end up holding a portfolio that is closer to the
optimal growth portfolio, and so his wealth may grow more rapidly. This was the argument
put forward by DSSW using a partial equilibrium setting. In this section, we examine the
long-run survival of the irrational trader in our general equilibrium setting.
From the competitive equilibrium derived in Section 3, we have the following result:
Proposition 4 Suppose η  =0 .L e tη  =2 ( γ − 1).F o rγ>1 and η  = η ,o n l yo n eo ft h e
15traders survives in the long run. In particular, we have
Pessimistic irrational trader: η<0 ⇒ Rational trader survives
Moderately optimistic irrational trader: 0 <η<η   ⇒ Irrational trader survives
Strongly optimistic irrational trader: η>η   ⇒ Rational trader survives.
(17)
For η = η , both rational and irrational traders survive.
For γ>1, Proposition 4 identiﬁes three distinct regions in the parameter space as shown
in Figure 5. For η<0, the irrational trader is pessimistic and does not survive in the
long-run. For 0 <η<η  , the irrational trader is moderately optimistic and survives in the
long-run while the rational trader does not. For η>η  , the irrational trader is strongly
optimistic and does not survive. Clearly, other than the knife-edge case (η = η ), only one








































Figure 5: The survival of rational and irrational traders for diﬀerent values of η and γ.F o r
each region in the parameter space, we document which of the agents survives in the long run.
“R” means that survival of the rational trader is guaranteed inside the region, “N” corresponds
to the irrational trader.
In order to gain more insight into what determines the survival of each type of traders, we
examine their terminal wealth (consumption) proﬁles. The two panels on the left in Figure
6 show the two traders’ terminal wealth proﬁles for two values of T (10 and 30) when the
irrational trader is pessimistic. The solid line shows the terminal wealth share of the rational
trader and the dashed line shows that for the irrational trader. As expected, the rational
trader ends up with more wealth in good states of the economy (when the dividend is high)
while the irrational trader, being pessimistic, ends up with more wealth in the bad states of
the economy. As the horizon increases, the irrational trader ends up with non-trivial wealth
in more extreme and less likely, low dividend states. When the irrational trader is mildly
optimistic, the situation is diﬀerent. His impact on the prices makes the bad states (i.e.,
16the low dividend states) cheaper than the good states. This induces the rational trader to
accumulate more wealth in the bad states by giving up wealth in the good states, including
those with high probabilities. As a result, the irrational trader is more likely to end up with
more wealth. When strongly optimistic, the irrational trader ends up accumulating wealth
in very unlikely, good states by giving up wealth in most other states, which leads to his






















































































































Figure 6: The terminal consumption of rational and irrational traders for diﬀerent horizon T.
We consider two values of T, 10 and 30, respectively. The model parameters are set at µ =0 .12,
σ =0 .18, and γ = 5. We consider three distinctive cases for the irrational trader’s belief:
(1) pessimistic, η = −0.3η , (2) moderately optimistic, η =0 .5η , and (3) strongly optimistic,









T), which has a standard normal distribution with zero mean and
unit variance, shown by the shaded area (vertical axis on the right). The two panels on the left
show the terminal consumption, as a fraction of the total consumption, of the rational trader
(solid line) and the irrational trader (dashed line) with a pessimistic belief, i.e., Cr,T/DT and
Cn,T/DT, for the two values of the horizon, T =1 0 ,30, respectively. The two panels in the
middle and on the right show the terminal consumption, as a fraction of the total consumption,
of the rational trader and the irrational trader with a moderately and strongly optimistic beliefs
for the two values of T, respectively.
It is important to recognize that our results on the long-run survival of irrational traders
are obtained in absence of intermediate consumption. In other words, these results are
primarily driven by the portfolio choices of diﬀerent traders in the market and their impact
17on prices. This allows us to focus on how irrational beliefs inﬂuence traders’ trading behavior
and how it alone aﬀects their wealth evolution. When intermediate consumption is allowed,
traders’ consumption policies will also be aﬀected by their beliefs, which can signiﬁcantly
aﬀect their wealth accumulation as well. The net impact of irrational belief on a trader’s
wealth evolution depends on how it aﬀects his portfolio choice and his consumption choice.
Using an inﬁnite horizon setting with intermediate consumption, Blume and Easley (2001)
and Sandroni (2000) have shown that traders with (persistently) irrational beliefs will not
survive while traders with rational beliefs will. Their analysis clearly shows that the inﬂuence
of incorrect beliefs on the irrational traders’ consumption policy can reduce their chance of
survival. However, their result relies on several conditions imposed on the traders’ preferences
and the aggregate endowment. For example, they require that aggregate endowment is
bounded above and below, away from zero. When these bounds are not imposed, as is
the case in this paper, traders with rational beliefs may not always survive while traders
with irrational beliefs may.2 To provide a comprehensive analysis of the survival conditions
with intermediate consumption is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future
research. But it suﬃces to say that even with intermediate consumption, the long-run
survival of irrational traders is possible in absence of further restrictions on preferences
and/or endowments.
Another diﬀerence between our setting and that of Blume and Easley (2001) is that we
use a particular and simple form of beliefs of the irrational traders. In our model, such traders
maintain a constant belief about the drift of the endowment process and do not update their
belief based on realized data. To maintain analytical tractability, we do not allow for a more
general form of beliefs, e.g., that resulting from ineﬃcient learning. However, in the setting
of Blume and Easley (2001), the speciﬁc form of the belief process is less important for
the survival results than the aggregate endowment process and agents’ preferences. Based
on this observation, we would expect the intuition of our model to apply to more general
settings as well, in particular to certain types of ineﬃcient learning.
6 The Price Impact of Irrational Traders
We have already seen in the case of logarithmic preferences that the irrational trader’s
inﬂuence on prices does not decay as quickly as his relative wealth share. In this section, we
extend our analysis to the general case for γ and characterize the precise combinations of
2In a simple case considered by Wang (1996), even among rational traders, survival depends on prefer-
ences. In our setting, we did not impose any upper or positive lower bounds on endowments.
18model parameters under which such phenomenon is possible.
Our interest is in the behavior of prices in the long run when the horizon of the economy,
T, is long. In order to obtain an explicit characterization, we look at the limit when T
approaches inﬁnity and derive from the limit an analytical approximation for a large, but
ﬁnite T. By the deﬁnition of the limit, this approximation becomes arbitrarily accurate when
T is suﬃciently large. Speciﬁcally, we call two stochastic processes asymptotically equivalent
if for large values of T, their ratio converges to unity with probability one.






which we denote XT ∼ YT.
When studying an economy with a long horizon, T, we need to have a sense about
what it means for a particular property of the economy to persist for a signiﬁcant period
of time. Suppose, for example, we claim that the irrational trader’s inﬂuence on a variable
is signiﬁcant as long as the variable exceeds a ﬁxed level e within a time interval. Such an
inﬂuence is persistent only if for a larger T, the corresponding time interval of the irrational
trader’s inﬂuence also increases in proportion. Otherwise, the fraction of time the irrational
trader does have an inﬂuence becomes smaller for a larger T and thus his inﬂuence is only
transitory and negligible.
To make this more formal, we consider the current time of observation to be t = λT,
0 <λ≤ 1. As T grows, the “current” time t increases as well, but it remains at a constant
fraction of the horizon of the economy. Moreover, the time remaining until the ﬁnal date of
the economy is also increasing proportionally to T. Since the properties of the equilibrium
prices and quantities depend on how much time is remaining until the ﬁnal date, they depend
on λ.







(γ − 1)(2γ − η)
,λ n ≡
η
η(γ +1 )− 2γ(γ − 1)
. (18)
It is easy to verify that for η<η  ,0<λ S ≤ 1; for 0 <η≤ η ,0<λ r ≤ 1; and for η<0o r
η>η  ,0<λ n ≤ 1. The limiting behavior of the stock price process can be characterized
as follows.
19Proposition 5 At t = λT, the stock price behaves as follows:








2(η−2γ)σ2t−σBt], 0 <λ<λ S
S∗
t,λ S <λ≤ 1








2η)σ2t+σBt], 0 <λ<λ S
S∗∗
t ,λ S <λ≤ 1




The values of the stock price in homogeneous economies, S∗
t and S∗∗
t , are given in Equation
(12). The asymptotic values of the instantaneous moments of stock returns are equal to the
moments of the corresponding asymptotic expressions for stock prices above.
Observe that in the ﬁrst two cases, when the irrational trader is pessimistic or moderately
optimistic, the stock price process does not converge quickly to its value in the economy
populated exclusively by the rational trader who survives in the long-run. Instead, over
long periods of time, i.e., for t between 0 and λST, the stock price process is aﬀected by
the presence of both traders. This can occur even when the wealth of the irrational trader
becomes negligible way before λST.3 We thus have generalized the results obtained in the
context of a log-utility economy. A trader can control an asymptotically inﬁnitesimal fraction
of the total wealth and yet exert a non-negligible eﬀect on the stock price. In other words,
convergence in wealth does not readily imply convergence in prices.
7 Portfolio Policies
Proposition 5 in the previous section established the possibility that a trader whose wealth
diminishes over time can have a persistent impact on asset prices. In this section, we study
3 For brevity, we have omitted the discussion of wealth distribution over time. Interested readers can
refer to our working paper, Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerﬁeld (2003), where we show that for cases 1 and
3, the irrational trader’s wealth is asymptotically negligible for any time λT with λ<λ S.
20the traders’ portfolio policies. In particular, we show that convergence in the price process
does not lead to immediate convergence in policies, which is another and somewhat subtle
channel through which traders with asymptotically inﬁnitesimal wealth may aﬀect the long-
run behavior of the economy. Moreover, by characterizing the portfolio policy one gains an
alternative view on long-run survival in equilibrium, which is complementary to the analysis
of state-contingent consumption choices in sections 4 and 5.
Expressions for portfolio policies are not available in closed form. However, using the
similar argument as in the proof of the bound on stock price volatility in Proposition 1, we
can establish the following result:
Proposition 6 For both traders, their portfolio weight in the stock, denoted by w,i sb o u n d e d :
|w|≤1+|η|(γ +1 ) /γ. (19)
The bound on the traders’ portfolio holdings is important for our results. It explicitly
shows that price impact of the irrational trader with negligible wealth does not rely on
excessive leverage. It also implies that our long-run survival results do not rely on the
traders’ use of high leverage. Our solution for the equilibrium remains valid even if traders
are constrained in their portfolio choices, as long as the constraint is suﬃciently loose to
allow for w = ±[1 + |η|(γ +1 ) /γ].
To analyze the traders’ portfolio policies in more detail, we decompose a trader’s stock
demand into two components, the myopic component and the hedging component. The sum
of the two gives the trader’s total stock demand. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 7 At t = λT, the individual stock holdings behave as follows:
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1−η, 0 <λ<min(λn,λ S)
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γ +0= 1 +
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Case 2. Moderately Optimistic Irrational Trader (0 <η<η  ):
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1+0= 1 ,λ S <λ≤ 1
Case 3. Strongly Optimistic Irrational Trader, (η  <η ):










γ =1 + η, 0 <λ<λ n
1+
η
γ +0= 1 +
η
γ,λ n <λ≤ 1
Since the moments of stock returns are asymptotically state-independent, it is intuitive to
expect that the implied portfolio policies are myopic. Proposition 7 shows, however, that this
is not true. In other words, the asymptotic portfolio policy can diﬀer signiﬁcantly from what
4The limit of the portfolio policy for values of λ ∈ [min(λn,λ S),max(λn,λ S)] can be characterized ex-
plicitly as well, but the results depend on the ordering between λn and λS, which in turn is determined by
the values of model parameters. We omit these results to simplify the exposition.
22the asymptotic moments of stock returns suggest. Such a surprising behavior can only be due
to the hedging component of the traders’ portfolio holdings since, by deﬁnition, the myopic
component of portfolio holdings depends only on the conditional mean and variance of stock
returns. Given that the instantaneous moments of stock returns are asymptotically state-
independent, it may seem surprising that the hedging component of portfolio holdings remain
ﬁnite, as Case 3 in Proposition 7 illustrates for the irrational trader. The reason behind this
result is that instantaneous moments of stock returns do not fully characterize the investment
opportunities traders face. In particular, moments of stock returns do not always stay
constant. As we have seen in Figure 2, for example, return volatility can change signiﬁcantly
as the relative wealth distribution changes. After a long time, the likelihood of the reversal of
wealth distribution between the rational and irrational traders and a shift in return moments
is relatively low. Nonetheless, the possibility of such a change remains important, which gives
rise to the signiﬁcant hedging demand in the traders’ portfolio holdings.
Figure 7 illustrates the behavior of the economy when the irrational trader is strongly
optimistic (η>η  ). In this case (Case 3 in Propositions 4, 5 and 7), the irrational trader
does not survive and has no price impact in the long-run. For the chosen set of parameter
values, λn =0 .29. The time of observation t is set to be 0.15T.T h u s t<λ nT.A s t h e
bottom panel of Figure 7 shows, with almost probability one, the rational trader controls
most of the wealth in the economy by this point in time. From Proposition 5, at this point
the stock price converge closely to the price in the economy populated by only the rational
trader. If we consider the Sharpe ratio of the stock, deﬁned by µS/σS, which characterizes
the instantaneous investment opportunity traders face, it also converges to its value of γσ
in the limiting economy with the rational trader only. The top panel of Figure 7 plots the
value of the Sharpe ratio for diﬀerent states of the economy at time t.I t i s o b v i o u s t h a t
with almost probability one, the value of the Sharpe ratio equals its limit γσ (the probability
distribution of the state of economy is shown by the shaded area). However, for very large
values of Dt (or Bt), the economy will be dominated by the irrational trader (as we see from
the bottom panel) and the instantaneous Sharpe ratio of the stock converges to its value in
an economy populated by the irrational trader only, which is (γ − η)σ. Such a possibility,
even though with very low probability under the true probability measure, can be important
to the irrational trade because under his belief, its likelihood can be non-trivial. As a result,
it can have a signiﬁcant impact on the irrational trader’s portfolio choice.
The importance of these low probability but large changes in the Sharpe ratio is reﬂected
23in the traders’ value function, which is given by
























State dependence of the indirect utility function, i.e., the eﬀect of possible changes in the
Sharpe ratio, is captured by the function h(t,Dt). The second panel of Figure 7 shows that
for the irrational trader h is non-constant over a wide range of values of Dt. It exhibits
signiﬁcant state-dependence even when the contemporaneous Sharpe ratio is approximately
constant. It is this state-dependence in the indirect utility function that induces hedging
demand. The third panel of Figure 7 shows hedging demand of the irrational trader. Over
a wide range of values of Dt, his hedging demand is non-zero. In particular, it is close to its
asymptotic value η(γ − 1)/γ (see Proposition 7), which equals 12.8 for the chosen values of
parameters.
What we conclude from this is that convergence of the stock price to a limiting process
does not necessarily imply convergence of the traders’ portfolio policies to their policies
under the limiting price process. Price paths of small probability under the true probability
measure can have a signiﬁcant impact on the traders’ portfolio policies. Thus, an intuitive
conjecture that convergence in price gives convergence in portfolio policies does not hold in
general. This result has important implications for the analysis of long-run survival as we
see in the next section.
8 Heuristic Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Survival
Although general equilibrium analysis is always desirable, its tractability is often limited.
Several authors such as DSSW have relied on heuristic partial equilibrium analysis to study
the survival of irrational traders. In this section, we want to examine the limitations of
partial equilibrium heuristics in our setting.
The essence of the partial equilibrium argument is to examine a limiting situation when
one of the two traders controls most of the aggregate wealth. Following DSSW, the argu-
ment then assumes that the inﬁnitesimal trader has no impact on market prices and all
traders follow portfolio policies close to those under the limiting prices. If the wealth of the
inﬁnitesimally small trader has a higher growth rate under the assumed portfolio policies, his
share of wealth will grow over time and he will be able to successfully “invade” the economy.
Hence, such traders can survive in the long-run, “in the sense that their wealth share does
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Figure 7: The behavior of the economy for the following parameter values: µ =0 .12, σ =0 .18,
γ =5 ,T = 30. Also, η =2 η  = 16, i.e., the irrational trader is strongly optimistic. The time of
observation is set at t =0 .15×T. The horizontal axis in all panels is the normalized state variable,
g0,T = BT/
√
T, which has a standard normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance, shown
by the shaded area (vertical axis on the right). The four panels from top to bottom show (i) the
instantaneous Sharpe ratio of stock returns, µS/σS; (ii) the state dependence of the indirect value
function of the rational trader, as captured by the function h(t,Dt) in (20); (iii) the portion of
the portfolio strategy of the irrational trader attributable to hedging demand, deﬁned as whedge
n =
wn − µS + ησ2
S/(γσ2
S); (iv) the fraction of the aggregate wealth controlled by the rational agent,
Wr/(Wr + Wn).
25not drop toward zero in the long run with probability one”.
In our setting, we can easily derive the survival conditions using this partial equilibrium
argument. In the limit when the economy is populated only by either the rational trader or
the irrational trader, the stock price follows the geometric Brownian motion:
dSt = St (µSdt + σSdBt). (21)
If only the rational trader is present, St = S∗
t and we have from (12) µS = γσ2 and σS = σ.




Suppose now an irrational trader is injected into the economy. Under his belief (given
by the measure Q), the drift of the stock price process is   µS = µS + σ2η and the volatility
remains at σ. He will chose to invest a fraction wn =   µS/(γσ2)=1+η/γ of his wealth in the






γ2η (γη  − η)
where η  =2 ( γ −1). The growth rate of wealth of the “invading” irrational trader is higher
than that of the dominant rational trader if and only if 0 <η<γ η  .
Next, assume that only the irrational trader is dominant. Then, St = S∗∗
t . Repeating the
steps of the previous analysis, the volatility of the limiting stock price remains at σ and the
drift becomes µS = γσ2 −ησ2. The growth rate of the irrational trader’s wealth is µS − 1
2σ2
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Figure 8: The survival of rational and irrational traders for diﬀerent values of η and γ in partial
equilibrium. For each region in the parameter space, we document which of the agents survives in
the long run. “R” means that survival of the rational trader is guaranteed inside the region, “N”
corresponds to the irrational trader, “N,R” means that both traders survive.
The partial equilibrium analysis thus appears to provide suﬃcient conditions for long-run
26survival of both types of traders. In particular, for γ>1
0 <η<
γ
2γ−1η  ⇒ Irrational trader survives
γ
2γ−1η  <η<γ η   ⇒ Both traders survive
η<0o rη>γ η   ⇒ Rational trader survives
(22)
For γ = 1, only the rational trader survives regardless of the value of η. Figure 8 summarizes
these results. Since γ/(2γ − 1) ≤ 1f o rγ ≥ 1, η  belongs to the second region in (22).
The survival conditions given in Figure 8 clearly diﬀer from the survival conditions from
general equilibrium analysis shown in Figure 5. The diﬀerence occurs when
γ
2γ−1η  <η<
γη . In particular, partial equilibrium argument predicts survival of both traders for these
parameter values while general equilibrium analysis shows the extinction of the irrational
trader when η>η  .
The diﬀerence in results from the partial equilibrium argument comes from its two as-
sumptions: (1) when the irrational trader becomes small in relative wealth, the stock price
behaves as if he is absent, and (2) both traders adopt the portfolio policies that would be
optimal under that limiting price process. We know from our analysis in Section 4 that the
ﬁrst assumption is false in general. But the more direct reason for the discrepancy in survival
results is because the second assumption is false. For instance, η  <η<γ η   corresponds to
Case 3 of Proposition 5, in which the stock price is asymptotically the same as in the econ-
omy without the irrational trader. In other words, the irrational trader has no signiﬁcant
impact on the current stock price as his wealth becomes negligible. The moments of stock
returns converge to the values implied by the partial equilibrium analysis. However, as we
have shown in Section 7, the irrational trader’s portfolio policy diﬀers signiﬁcantly from what
the partial equilibrium analysis assumes. In particular, he does not simply hold the port-
folio implied by the limiting price process. This explains the deviations in the conclusions
about long-run survival from the heuristic partial equilibrium argument and demonstrates
the limitations of partial equilibrium arguments and the importance of equilibrium eﬀects
on survival.
9C o n c l u s i o n
The analysis above has examined the long-run price impact and survival of irrational traders
who use persistently wrong beliefs to make their portfolio choices. Using a parsimonious
model with no intermediate consumption, we have shown that irrational traders can maintain
27a persistent inﬂuence on prices even after they have lost most of their wealth. Our analysis
of conditions for survival of either type of traders further highlights the importance of taking
into account the eﬀect that traders have on asset prices.
For tractability, we have conﬁned our analysis to preferences with constant relative risk
aversion. Extensions of our analysis to more general preferences are possible and may yield
unexpected results. We have also assumed that the rational and irrational traders diﬀer
only in their beliefs but not in their preferences. This allows us to focus on the impact of
irrational beliefs on survival and prices. Of course, diﬀerences in time and risk preferences can
have their own implications for long-run survival. Perhaps more important is the extension
of these results to models with intermediate consumption and to alternative preferences.
While there is more to be done in this area, it is fair to say that a general message is
emerging and is unlikely to be overturned. Namely, survival and price impact are related
but distinct concepts and the arguments ignoring such a distinction are unreliable. In our
model, irrational traders can survive and even dominate rational traders, but even when
they do not survive, they can still have a persistent impact on asset prices.
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30AP r o o f s
Proof of Proposition 1
The optimality conditions of the maximization problem in (8a) require that
Cr,T = Cn,T (bξ T)
1/γ .
Combined with the market clearing condition (8b), this implies (9a) and (9b).
The state price density must be proportional to the traders’ marginal utilities. Since we
set the interest rate equal to zero, the state price density conditional on the information

















The price of any payoﬀ ZT is therefore given by (11).
The individual budget constraint in a dynamically complete market is equivalent to the
static constraint that the initial wealth of a trader is equal to the present value of the trader’s
consumption (e.g., Cox and Huang (1989). Since the two traders in our model have identical











































 γ  = Wn,0. (A.1)













T = e− 1
2(1−γ)2σ2T+(1−γ)σBT,w h e r eP is the original
probability measure. Using the translation invariance property of the Gaussian distribution,
the random variable B
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T ). Since the variable B
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T is equivalent in distribution to




















































































T = e− 1
8η2σ2T+ 1
2ησBT and use a change of measure























The symmetry of the distribution of the normal random variable BT implies that F(z)=
F(−z), therefore F  (z)|z=0 = 0. This veriﬁes that b = eησ2(γ−1)T.
We now prove that the conditional volatility of stock returns is bounded between σ and

































 γ  = e(µ−σ2γ)T+(− 1
2σ2(1−2γ))te
σBt Et [(1 + g)γ]
Et [(1 + gA)γ]
.




= σ + ησ
 
Et [(1 + gA)γ−1]
Et [(1 + gA)γ]
−
Et [(1 + g)γ−1]
Et [(1 + g)γ]
 
. (A.2)
To establish the bounds on stock return volatility, we prove that
Et [(1 + gA)γ−1]
Et [(1 + gA)γ]
−
Et [(1 + g)γ−1]
Et [(1 + g)γ]
≥ 0( A . 3 )


















Thus, to prove (A.3), it suﬃces to show that ∂2 ln(Et [(1 + gA)γ])/∂A∂γ≥ 0. The function
(1 + gA)γ is log-supermodular in A, g,a n dγ, since it is positive and it’s cross-partial
derivatives in all arguments are positive. Thus, according to the additivity property of log-
supermodular functions (e.g., Athey (2002)), Et [(1 + gA)
γ] is log-supermodular in A and γ,
i.e., ∂2 ln(Et [(1 + gA)
γ])/∂A∂γ≥ 0.
Because A>1 if and only if η<0 , we have shown that
η
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Et [(1 + gA)γ]
−
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Et [(1 + g)γ]
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is bounded between −1a n d0f o rη<0, and be-
t w e e n0a n d1f o rη>0, we obtain the upper bound from (A.2): σSt ≤ σ(1 + |η|).
Proof of Proposition 3
We will make use of the following result:
Lemma A.1 Let N(x) denote the cumulative density function of the standard normal dis-






















2 . Note that for conve-
nience, we have deﬁned the cumulative density function as the probability above a given
value rather than below.
Let t = T/(1 + |η|) and deﬁne M =
√
2−1
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which establishes the ﬁrst result of the proposition. The second result follows from the fact

























2 t+σ|η|Mt ≤ e
− 1
12σ2η2t


















which concludes the proof of the proposition.
34Proof of Proposition 4























Using the strong Law of Large Numbers for Brownian motion (see Karatzas and Shreve








where convergence takes place almost surely. The proposition then follows.
Proof of Proposition 5
Our analysis will make use of the following technical result.
Lemma A.2 Consider a stochastic process Xt = ect+vB t and a constant a ≥ 0. Assume
that ac + 1
2v2a2(1−λ)  =0 , 0 ≤ λ<1. Then the limit limT→∞Et[Xa
T] is equal to either zero








(ii) (Convergence of moments)
lim
T→∞
meant Et [(1 + XT)a]




volt Et [(1 + XT)a]
volt (1 + Et [Xa
T])
=1 ( A . 5 )
where meantft and voltft denote the instantaneous mean and standard deviation of the process
lnft respectively.
Proof of Lemma A.2










2(1 − λ)T + avBt
 
. (A.6)
35The limit of Et[Xa
T] is equal to zero if ac+ 1
2v2a2(1−λ) < 0 and equal to inﬁnity if the opposite
inequality holds (according to the strong Law of Large Numbers for Brownian motion, see
Karatzas and Shreve, 1991, Sec. 2.9.A).
Because the function acT +
1
2v2a2(1−λ)T is convex in a and equal to zero when a =0 ,








→ 0, ∀ z ∈ (0,a) (A.7a)
Et [X
a
T] → 0 ⇒ Et [X
z
T] → 0, ∀ z ∈ (0,a). (A.7b)
We prove the result of the lemma separately for six regions covering the entire parameter
space.
Case 1: 0 ≤ a ≤ 1,Et [Xa
T] →∞ .
If XT ≤ 1, (XT +1 )




T ≤ a since
(XT +1 )
a is concave and a − 1 ≤ 0. Therefore, Xa
T ≤ (1 + XT)
a ≤ Xa
T +2 a + a, and hence
limT→∞Et [(1 + XT)a]/Et[Xa
T] = 1, which implies limT→∞Et [(1 + XT)a]/(1 + Et[Xa
T]) = 1.
Case 2: 1 ≤ a ≤ 2,Et [Xa
T] →∞ .
By the mean value theorem, (1 + XT)a = Xa
T + a(w + XT)a−1 for some w ∈ [0,1]. Using
t h ea n a l y s i so fc a s e1 ,( w + XT)a−1 ≤ (1 + XT)a−1 ≤ X
a−1
T +2 a−1 + a − 1, which, combined
with (A.7a), implies that limT→∞Et [(1 + XT)a]/Et [Xa
T] = 1 and the main result follows.
Case 3: 2 ≤ a,Et [Xa
T] →∞ .
By the mean value theorem, (1 + XT)
a = Xa
T + a(w + XT)a−1 for some w ∈ [0,1]. By
Jensen’s inequality, [(1 + XT)/2]a−1 ≤ (1 + X
a−1
T )/2. Thus,
0 ≤ (w + XT)






which, combined with (A.7a) implies that limT→∞Et[(1 + XT)a]/Et [Xa
T]=1a n dt h em a i n
result follows.
Case 4: 0 ≤ a ≤ 1,Et [Xa
T] → 0:
If XT ≤ 1, (1 + XT)
a ≤ 1+XT ≤ 1+Xa




T since (1 + XT)
a is concave. Thus, 1 ≤ (1 + XT)
a ≤ 1+Xa
T and therefore
limT→∞Et [(1 + XT)a] = 1, which implies the main result.
Case 5: 1 ≤ a ≤ 2,Et[Xa
T] → 0.
36By the mean value theorem, (1 + XT)a =1+aXT(1 + wXT)a−1 for some w ∈ [0,1].




T +2 a−1 + a − 1
 
,u s i n gt h es a m e
argument as in case 1. Since limT→∞Et[Xa
T] = 0, according to (A.7b), limT→∞Et[XT]=0
and hence limT→∞Et[(1 + XT)a]=1 .
Case 6: 2 ≤ a,Et[Xa
T] → 0.
By the mean value theorem, (1 + XT)a =1+aXT(1 + wXT)a−1 for some w ∈ [0,1].
Further, XT(1+wXT)a−1 ≤ XT(1+XT)a−1 ≤ 2a−2XT +2a−2Xa
T by Jensen’s inequality. Since
limT→∞Et[Xa
T] = 0, according to (A.7b), and limT→∞Et[XT] = 0 and hence limT→∞Et[(1+
XT)a]=1 .
(ii) Since the conditional expectations Et[(1 + XT)a]a n dE t[1 + Xa
T] are martingales,
they have zero drift for all values of T and t. By Ito’s lemma, convergence of the ﬁrst
moments of the natural logarithms of the same processes follows from convergence of the
second moments.
We now establish convergence of volatility of the process Et[(1 + XT)a]. According to
Ito’s lemma, one must show that
lim
T→∞
∂ lnEt [(1 + XT)a]/∂Bt
∂ ln(1 + Et[Xa
T])/∂Bt
=1 , ∀ a ≥ 0.
Given (A.6), it suﬃces to prove that limT→∞∂ lnEt [(1 + XT)a]/∂Bt = 0 if limT→∞Et [Xa
T]=
0 and limT→∞∂ lnEt [(1 + XT)a]/∂Bt = av if limT→∞Et[Xa
T]=∞.
First, changing the order of diﬀerentiation and expectation operators (see Billingsley
1995, Th. 16.8),
∂ lnEt [(1 + XT)a]
∂Bt
= av
Et [XT(1 + XT)a−1]




Et [(1 + XT)a−1]
Et [(1 + XT)a]
 
.
Furthermore, according to part (i),
Et [(1 + XT)a−1]
Et [(1 + XT)a]
∼




Assume a ≥ 1. As we have shown in case 1 of the proof of part (i), X
a−1
T ≤ (1 + XT)a−1 ≤
X
a−1
T +2a−1+a−1. If Et [Xa







T] → 0, which yields
limT→∞∂ lnEt [(1 + XT)
a]/∂Bt = av. Similarly, if Et [Xa







= 0, which, according to part (i), implies that limT→∞Et [(1 + XT)a−1]=
1 and limT→∞∂ lnEt [(1 + XT)
a]/∂Bt =0 .
37Next, consider the case of 0 <a<1. If Et[Xa
T] →∞ , because Et[(1+XT)a−1] ≤ 1, (A.8)
implies limT→∞∂ lnEt[(1 + XT)a]/∂Bt = av.
Suppose that limT→∞Et[Xa
T] = 0. By Markov’s inequality, for any  >0, Pt[XT >
 ] ≤ Et[Xa
T]/ a → 0. Similarly, Pt [XT <  ] ≤ Et[(1 + XT)a−1]/(1 +  )a−1.T h u s , 1 ≥
Et[(1+XT)a−1] ≥ Pt[XT <  ](1+ )a−1, and liminfT→∞Et[(1+XT)a−1] ≥ (1+ )a−1 for any
 >0. This implies that limT→∞Et[(1+XT)a−1] = 1 and limT→∞∂ lnEt[(1 + XT)a]/∂Bt =0 .
We establish the long-run behavior of St for the case when γ>1a n d0<η<η   =
2(γ − 1). The results for all other regions in the parameter space can be obtained similarly.


















































































































t = e− 1





t − (1 − γ)σ(T − t), where B
Q
t is a Brownian motion under the measure Q.U s i n g t h e




















We will omit the superscript Q, since the distribution of B
Q
t under the measure Q is the
same as the distribution of Bt under the original measure P.
38Using the assumption that t = λT, deﬁne






































We next examine E(2). Using a similar change of measure, we ﬁnd
E





























The value of limT→∞Et[Xa








∞, −2η + λ(2γη− η2) > 0,
0, −2η + λ(2γη− η2) < 0,
(see the proof of lemma A.2, part (i)). Deﬁne λS ≡
2
2γ−η. Note that, because γ>1a n d
0 <η<2(γ − 1), 0 <λ S < 1. Then, limT→∞Et[Xa
T]=∞ if λ>λ S and 2γη − η2 > 0















































2σ2γ2)t−σγBt, 0 ≤ λ<λ S
e(−µγ+ 1
2σ2(1+γ)γ−σ2η)T+(− 1
2σ2(η−γ)2)t+σ(η−γ)Bt,λ S <λ≤ 1
Having established the behavior of both the numerator and the denominator of the ex-
pression for the stock price, we have proven the limiting result for the stock price itself.
According to part (ii) of lemma A.2, not only the stock price, but also the mean and volatil-
ity of returns behave according to the asymptotic expressions of Proposition 5 in the limit
of the economy horizon T approaching inﬁnity.
Proof of Proposition 7
When the ﬁnancial markets are dynamically complete and there is a single source of uncer-
tainty (driven by a Brownian motion), the fraction of the agent’s wealth invested in stock
can be computed as a ratio of the instantaneous volatility of the agent’s wealth to the instan-
taneous volatility of the cumulative stock return process. Proposition 5 and (Kogan, Ross,
Wang, and Westerﬁeld, 2003, Proposition 8) provide expression for the long-run behavior of
the volatility of stock returns and individual wealth processes, from which the expression for
portfolio holdings follow immediately. To decompose the portfolio holdings of the rational
trader into as a sum of the myopic and hedging demands, we compute the hedging demand
as µS/(γσ2
S), where µS and σS are the drift and the diﬀusion coeﬃcients of the stock return
process. The diﬀerence between the total portfolio holdings and the myopic component de-
ﬁne the agent’s hedging demand. For the irrational trader, the calculations are analogous,
except the myopic demand is given by ˆ µS/(γσ2
S)=( µS + ησσS)/(γσ2
S), where ˆ µS is the
expected stock return as perceived by the irrational trader.
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